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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: Capital Punishment for Rape
Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment
When No Life Is Taken or Endangered
Petitioner was accused of arming himself with a tire iron,
breaking into the victim's home, and committing forceable rape
and sodomy after threatening the victim and her son with death
if she refused to submit. Convicted of rape by a three judge court
sitting without a jury, he was sentenced to death in 1961. The
conviction was affirmed,1 and certiorari was denied by the
United States Supreme Court.2  After four unsuccessful peti-
tions for post-conviction relief in the state courts of Maryland'
and four unsuccessful habeas corpus petitions at the federal
level,4 he again petitioned the federal district court, challenging
the constitutionality of the death sentence. Petitioner appealed
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals from a denial of that
petition. The Court, per Butzner, J., remanded, holding that
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment forbids the death penalty in rape cases in which
the victim's life is not endangered. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d
786 (4th Cir. 1970).
The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted ' 5 and is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Exactly what consti-
1. Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 174 A.2d 163 (1961).
2. Ralph v. State, 369 U.S. 813 (1962).
3. Misc. Pet. 2593, affd, Ralph v. Warden, 230 Md. 616, 185 A.2d
366 (1962); Misc. Pet. 3171; Misc. Pet. 3354, a}fd, Ralph v. Warden, 245
Md. 74, 224 A.2d 851 (1966); and Misc. Pet. 3869, leave to appeal denied,
Ralph v. Warden, 250 Md. 672, 245 A.2d 592 (1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 1002 (1969).
4. Ralph v. Pepersack, 203 F. Supp. 752 (D.Md. 1962); Ralph v.
Pepersack, 218 F. Supp. 932 (D.Md. 1963), afi'd, 335 F.2d 128 (4th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 925 (1965); Ralph v. Brough, 248 F. Supp.
334 (D.Md. 1965); Ralph v. Warden, 264 F. Supp. 528 (D.Md.), affd,
No. 11, 549 (4th Cir. 1967) (mern. dec.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968).
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V]IL
6. The early Supreme Court decisions refused to apply the "cruel
and unusual" punishment clause to sentences imposed for state crimes.
See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); McElvaine v. Brush, 142
U.S. 155 (1891); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). In 1947, in Louisi-
ana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947), the Court first
indicated that its view might be changing when it said, "[W]e shall
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tutes "cruel and unusual" punishment, however, is unclear. The
legislative history of the amendment is nearly barren, for the
provision received little debate in Congress prior to approval for
adoption by the states; the only major criticism was that the
clause was too indefinite. 7 In its first ruling on the amendment
the Supreme Court echoed Congressional concern, stating that
"[d] ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the
extent of the Constitutional provision." Eighty years later
the Court again noted that "the words of the amendment are
not precise" and that the "exact scope of the constitutional
phrase has not been detailed by this court."9
While a few courts and commentators have considered the
meaning of the word "unusual" and its relationship to "cruel"
in discussing the constitutionality of a particular punishment,"'
most courts ignore the term "unusual" in the clause and deter-
mine only whether the penalty is cruel. As the Supreme
Court stated in Trop v. Dulles:1
Whether the word "unusual" has any qualitative meaning dif-
ferent from "cruel" is not clear. On the few occasions this
Court has had to consider the meaning of the phrase, precise dis-
tinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have
been drawn. . . . These cases indicate that the Court simply
examines the particular punishment involved in light of the ba-
sic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to
subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word "unus-
ual."12
examine the circumstances [of the case] under the assumption, but with-
out so deciding, that violation of the principles of the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments, as to double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment,
would be violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Finally, in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), the
court explicitly held that a person could be subjected to "cruel and un-
usual" punishment for a state crime under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
7. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910).
8. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
9. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99, 100 (1958). See also Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D.Cal. 1966), in which the court restated
the concession by the Supreme Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
at 368, that "[w]hat constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has
not been exactly decided." and then added, "This statement is as true
today as it was in 1910." 257 F. Supp. at 679.
10. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 n.32 (1957); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 401 (1910) (dissenting opinion); Goldberg &
Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L.
R v. 1773, 1789-92 (1970); Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF.
L. REv. 1268, 1345 (1968); Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amend-
ment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV.
846, 849-50 (1961).
11. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
12. Id. at 100 n.32.
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Yet, even in determining whether a punishment is cruel, the
courts have taken inconsistent stands in determining 1) whether
the unconstitutional mode of punishment must be cruel per se or
cruel in proportion to the crime; 2) the standard to be applied
to determine cruelty; and 3) the application of that standard to
the cases at bar.
1. Mode or Proportionality of Punishment
Most nineteenth and early twentieth century decisions in-
terpreting "cruel and unusual punishment" clauses focused upon
the mode of punishment without even considering the magnitude
of the crime. In Wilkerson v. Utah 3 and In re Kemmnler, 14 the
Supreme Court looked only at the forms of punishment-death
by shooting and electrocution respectively-and concluded that
although punishment is cruel when torture or lingering death
is involved, the mere extinction of life does not constitute
'cruel and unusual" punishment.15  Moreover, most lower
court decisions construing the Eighth Amendment or its coun-
terparts in state constitutions concluded that the provisions re-
stricted the judiciary to an examination of the mode of punish-
ment exclusive of the crime for which it was imposed.' 6
Gradually courts began to examine the severity of the pun-
ishment in relation to the crime. In 1899, the Massachusetts su-
preme court, in McDonald v. Commonwealth," was the first to
concede that long imprisonment might be so disproportionate
to the offense as to constitute "a cruel and unusual punish-
13. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
14. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
15. Although both Wilkerson and Kemmler involved punishments
for murder such that it could be argued that the Court might have de-
clred the death penalty unconstitutional for lesser offenses, no language
in the opinion dictates such a result.
16. In Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 71 Mass. 482, 486 (1855), the
Massachusetts court concluded that "[tlhe question whether the punish-
ment is too severe, and disproportionate to the offence [sic) is for the
legislature to determine." The Virginia supreme court, in Aldridge v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. 447, 449-50 (1826), held that "[tlhat provision
[prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments] was never designed to con-
trol the Legislative right to determine ad Libitum upon the adequacy of
punishment, but is merely applicable to the modes of punishment." The
supreme court of Georgia in Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872), de-
cided that "[ilt would be an interference with matters left by the Con-
stitution to the legislative department, for us to undertake to weigh the
propriety of this or that penalty fixed by the Legislature for specific of-
fenses."
17. 173 Mass. 322 (1899).
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ment,"1 8 and Justice Field, dissenting in O'Neil v. Vermont", in
1892, a case involving over 50 years for liquor violations, noted:
"The inhibition [of the Eighth Amendment] is directed...
against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. ' 20
In 1901 the New Mexico territorial court was the first to ana-
lyze the constitutionality of a punishment in terms of its re-
lationship to the crime committed. In Territory v. Ketchum,2'
a case involving an attempted train robbery for which appel-
lant was sentenced to death, the territorial court assumed that
the death penalty is not cruel within the prohibition of the Con-
stitution,22 but went on to examine the gravity of the crime be-
fore concluding that it could not "say that we deem the death
penalty in any degree excessive as compared with the gravity of
the offense .... 23
The Ketchum disproportionality doctrine was adopted by the
United States Supreme Court nine years later in Weems v.
United States,24 a case in which a Phillipine coast guard officer
convicted of falsifying an official document was sentenced to
15 years hard labor in chains, loss of the right to vote and
hold office, and subjection to permanent surveillance. The Court
declared the punishment unconstitutional even though such pun-
ishment for a more serious crime would have been upheld. After
stating that few states or nations impose such sentences for
similar offenses the Court concluded:
Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed
their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending
citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and
believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense.25
Despite Weems, courts were reluctant to adopt the propor-
tionality test.26 By the 1950's, however, the trend had changed, 27
18. Id. at 328.
19. 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (dissenting opinion).
20. Id. at 339.
21. 10 N.M. 718, 65 P. 169 (1901).
22. Id. at 719, 65 P. at 169.
23. Id. at 725, 65 P. at 171.
24. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
25. Id. at 366-67.
26. Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 744, 109 S.E. 582, 587 (1921).
The court noted that while there was a difference of judicial opinion, "a
large majority of the American courts" had held that the "cruel and un-
usual" punishment clause imposed only a limitation upon the legislative
right to determine and prescribe the mode of punishments and not upon
the quantum of punishment. See also Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391 (1916), and a discussion of that case and its relationship to
[Vol. 56:95
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and in 1962 the Supreme Court for the first time since Weems
explicitly upheld the "proportionality doctrine" in a case in
which petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor under a Cali-
fornia statute making it criminal for a person to be addicted
to narcotics. 2 8 Although the sentence was only 90 days, the
court concluded it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, ruling:
We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus
afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any
narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular
behavior there inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure, impri-
sonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment
which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be
considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a
cruel and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a
common cold.2 9
2. Standard for Determining Cruelty
The standard used by the courts to determine whether pun-
ishments are cruel per se or in proportion to the offenses has
also undergone significant changes since the beginning of the
twentieth century. While the new criterion is more rational
than that used in the early cases, it is also more indefinite
and therefore much more difficult to apply. For over a century
subsequent to the ratification of the Eighth Amendment courts
refused to declare punishments "cruel and unusual" unless they
were so regarded under the English Bill of Rights in 168830 and by
Weems in Turkington, Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishments: An
Examination of the Eighth Amendment and the Weems Principle, 3 Crim.
L. Bull. 145, 148 (1967) and Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
15 WAYNE L. REv. 882, 884 (1969).
27. In State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 57-58, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (1952),
the Idaho supreme court summarized the development:
Cruel and unusual punishments were originally regarded as
referring to such barbarous impositions as pillory, burning at
the stake, breaking on the wheel, drawing and quartering, and
the like. But it is now generally recognized that imprisonment
for such a length of time as to be out of all proportion to the
gravity of the offense committed, and such as to shock the con-
science of reasonable men, is cruel and unusual within the
meaning of the constitution.
28. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
29. Id. at 667.
30. Justice Story, in commenting upon the amendment stated that
it was "adopted as an admonition to all departments of the national gov-
ernment to warn them against such violent proceedings as had taken
place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts," and
indicated that was its sole purpose. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNTE STATES, 610-11 (3rd ed. 1851).
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colonial Americans.3 1  In Weems v. United States,32 however,
while the Supreme Court extended the scope of the Eighth
Amendment to disproportionally large punishments, it also al-
tered the standard for determining whether such punishments
were cruel or excessive. Realizing that imprisonment in chains
for forgery would have been tolerated in colonial times, the
Court nevertheless struck down the punishment, noting that a
constitutional principle "to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the principle which gave it birth."33
In 1957 in Trop v. DulleS3 4 the Supreme Court clearly re-
jected the colonial test. It noted that the "scope [of the Eighth
Amendment] is not static," but that it draws its meaning from
the evolving standards of society.3 5 The lower courts have at-
tempted to provide more structure for this standard, frequently
stating that the test is whether today the act is considered so dis-
proportionate to the offense committed as "to shock the moral
sense of all reasonable men, "36 "to be completely arbitrary and
shocking to the sense of justice, '3 7 or to shock "the conscience
and sense of justice of the people of the United States."3
3. Application of the Standard
The static standard of the Eighth Amendment contained lit-
tle ambiguity and was easily applied. The courts that ap-
plied the cruel per se standard consistently upheld the death
penalty, but consistently indicated they would strike it down if
it involved a form of torture similar to those practiced in En-
31. The Georgia supreme court in Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297, 301
(1872), refused to declare unconstitutional a six month sentence for as-
sault because it "doubt[ed] if it even entered into the minds of men of
that day [the day the Eighth Amendment was adopted] that a crime such
as this deserved a less penalty than the judge inflicted." Even as
late as 1921, in Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 741, 109 S.E. 582,
587 (1920), the Virginia supreme court upheld its predecessors' rule that
the state's "cruel and unusual punishment" provision only prohibited
"such punishments ... as were regarded as cruel and unusual when such
provision of the constitution was adopted in 1776."
32. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
33. Id. at 373.
34. 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
35. Id. at 100-01.
36. State v. Teague, 215 Ore. 609, 611, 336 P.2d 338, 340 (1959),
quoting Sustar v. County Court, 101 Ore. 657, 665, 201 P. 445, 448 (1921).
37. Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir. 1957).
38. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952), quoting United States ex rel. Bongiorno v.
Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945).
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gland during the reign of the Stuarts.30 Even those courts
that applied the proportionality standard did not hesitate to up-
hold the death penalty in all cases except those involving mi-
nor offenses since the death penalty was commonly used in colo-
nial America for larceny, burglary and even forgery.
40
The courts have encountered more difficulties in applying the
doctrine that punishments so disproportionate as to shock the
evolving conscience are unconstitutional. In making this assess-
ment the Supreme Court has generally considered in detail the
effect of the crime upon society,41 the effect of the punishment on
the criminal,42 the punishment generally imposed for more
serious crimes and the number of states and nations imposing
such penalties. Such a broad review enables courts to consider
both their own views of cruelty and those of state, federal and
foreign legislatures as representatives of their citizenry. 43 Most
lower courts, however, consider only whether the punishment
shocks the populace44 and the number of other jurisdictions that
impose the same penalty, without including their own assessment
of whether the punishment is excessive based on the gravity of
the crime and the effect of the punishment upon the offender.4 5
39. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130 (1878); Garcia v. Territory, 1 N.M. 415 (1869).
40. Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872).
41. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
42. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1957).
43. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1957); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910).
44. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 487, 493, 190 A.2d
514, 517 (1963). But see Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374
(Ky. 1968), and Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D.Cal. 1966),
in which it was suggested that one factor in determining the constitu-
tionality of the sentence should be whether it is necessary to rehabili-
tate the offender, and Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 11, 136 S.E.2d 766, 769
(1964), in which the court declared: "[W]e would question the judicial
right of any American judge to construe the American Constitution con-
trary to its apparent meaning, the American history of the clause, and its
construction by American courts, simply because the numerous nations
and States have abandoned capital punishment for rape."
45. In fact in United States ex Tel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp.
973 (N.D.JII. 1944), affd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
865 (1945), the author of the majority opinion, upholding a 199-year sen-
tence in a felony murder case in which the petitioner participated in the
robbery but did not kill the victim, conceded:
The writer of this memorandum must admit that to him a sen-
tence of a court which determines that a person who is ad-judged not to deserve death must serve a term of imprisonment
in a penitentiary, from which he cannot reasonably hope to be
relieved so long as he lives, is cruel. The writer regretfully
states that he believes his view on the subject is that of the
19711
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Largely because of the requirement imposed by most lower
courts 46 that a punishment cannot shock the conscience if a num-
ber of jurisdictions enforce it and a significant percentage of
the public support it, few punishments have been declared un-
constitutional even under the "proportionality test" as deter-
mined by "evolving standards," and on numerous occasions the
death penalty has been upheld.47  Even in non-homicide cases
the death penalty is generally not regarded as unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate. Offenses for which the death penalty
has been upheld include armed robbery, 48 kidnapping,'19 treason,"
rape,51 and attempted rape.5 2 In recent years, however, there has
been some indication that courts would declare death an uncon-
stitutionally disproportionate punishment for rape and attempted
rape in certain situations,5 3 although until the Ralph decision, no
minority. It follows that, in spite of the personal opinion of
the writer regarding the cruelty of the sentence, the court can-
not say that the 199-year sentence, imposed as a punishment
for murder in the case at bar, is cruel and unusual punishment
under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to the Consti-
tution of the United States.
46. Another reason, of course, is the expressed reluctance of courts
to question the legislatures' apportionment of punishment for criminal of-
fenses. See Coon v. United States, 360 F.2d 550, 555 (8th Cir. 1966);
State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 587, 593-94, 190 A.2d 514, 517 (1963). The result
of these two factors led one commentator to observe, "Few constitu-
tional guarantees of individual liberty have so often been relied upon
to so little avail, as has the eighth amendment." Note, supra note 10, at
846.
47. See, e.g., Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760, 765 (D.Colo.),
aff'd, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968); Rivers v. State, 226 So.2d 337, 338
(Fla. 1969); Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). All
of these cases were decided subsequent to the United States Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement that the death penalty per se is not
"cruel and unusual." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1957) (dictum).
Since Trop, the Supreme Court has avoided the issue by deciding cases
involving that problem on procedural grounds without reference to the
punishment's constitutionality. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Goldberg and Der-
showitz, supra note 10, at 1798-1802.
48. Ellis v. State, 19 P.2d 972 (Okla. Crim. App. 1933); Territory v.
Ketchum, 10 N.M. 718, 65 P. 169 (1901).
49. Coon v. United States, 360 F.2d 550, 554-55 (8th Cir. 1966).
50. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
51. Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 964 (1967); Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966); Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965); Rudolph v. State, 152 So.2d 662 (Ala.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
52. Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 109 S.E. 582 (1921).
53. In Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), the Supreme Court
denied certiorari to a petitioner sentenced to death for rape. Justices
Goldberg, Douglas and Brennan dissented, saying they "would grant
[Vol. 56:95
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such punishment for rape had actually been struck down.14
To determine whether the punishment imposed in Ralph
was disproportionate, the court did not look to the effect of
the offense on society or to its own views concerning the pun-
ishment's excessiveness. 55 It simply examined the number of
states and foreign nations that permit the death penalty in
rape cases,56 the extent to which juries or judges actually sen-
tenced offenders to death under these statutes57 and the extent
to which rapists had actually been executed after receiving death
certiorari in this case... to consider whether the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution permit the imposition of
the death penalty on a convicted rapist who has neither taken nor en-
dangered human life." They suggested that they considered capital
punishment in such a case unconstitutional. Subsequent lower federal
court decisions also indicated that the death penalty in rape cases like
those suggested in the dissent in Rudolph might be unconstitutional. The
Fourth Circuit Court stated in Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.
1966):
There is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of
rapists. If one were sentenced to death upon conviction of rape
of an adult under circumstances lacking great aggravation, the
Supreme Court might well find it an appropriate case to con-
sider the constitutional question tendered to us. Even an infe-
rior court such as ours might find the question foreclosed to it
if the actual and potential harm to the victim was relatively
slight.
Id. at 627. In three rape cases, the Eighth Circuit recognized (without
approving or rejecting) the dissent's position in Rudolph but concluded
that in any case, the victims' lives had been endangered. Harris v.
Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 894-95 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964
(1967); Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966); Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325, 332 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965).
54. In Calhoun v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 496, 214 S.W. 335 (1919), the
state court did declare the death penalty for rape to be "cruel and unusal"
punishment. However, the decision seems to be based upon the court's
reluctance to believe that the defendant was actually guilty of rape rather
than upon the grounds that the death penalty for an admitted rapist was
unconstitutional. The court noted that the alleged victim was of ques-
tionable moral character, that she said nothing about resisting, that her
appearance after the alleged offense did not reveal that she had been
raped, that the incident occurred within calling distance of her home
although she didn't cry out and that she had told conflicting stories con-
cerning whether the rape attempt had been successful. The court con-
cluded, "[W]e do believe under the facts and circumstances in this case
that this verdict is excessive." 85 Tex. Crim. at 504, 214 S.W. at 338.
55. In fact, the court explicitly stated: "The constitutionality of
Ralph's punishment cannot rest on the subjective opinions of thejudges who imposed the sentence or of the judges who must review the
case. On the contrary, his punishment must be tested objectively." Id.
at 789.
56. Id. at 791-93.
57. Id. at 792-93.
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sentences.5" It found that only sixteen states and four nations
permitted capital punishment in rape cases,D that only a small
percentage of convicted rapists received the death penalty even
in those states60 and that no one had been executed for rape in
the United States since 1964.61 Concluding that these figures sug-
gested the popular rejection of the death penalty in rape cases,0 2
it ruled that capital punishment in such cases constituted a viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment where-as in Ralph-life was nei-
ther taken nor endangered.3
Although the court in Ralph followed tests for determining
the constitutionality of sentences that had been used for over
half a century, its decision wrought a major change in the fields
of criminal and constitutional law. No previous federal court
had been willing to invalidate capital punishment for any
crime as serious as rape. In fact, many lower federal courts had
been unwilling even to consider the constitutionality of such pun-
ishments until the Supreme Court ruled on the issue. 4 Yet de-
spite the willingness of the Fourth Circuit to consider this case
and despite the apparently proper result in light of the Weems
criteria, there are two basic problems inherent in the Ralph opin-
ion which will confuse future courts and which could bring un-
fortunate results that neither the adopters of the Eighth Amend-
ment nor the Supreme Court intended. The first is the dif-
ficulty and the undesirability of having to determine whether
life has been endangered by the rapist in determining the con-
58. Id.
59. Id. at 791-92.
60. Id. at 792-93.
61. Id. at 792.
62. Id. at 790-93.
63. Id. at 793. Although the figures compiled in Ralph v. Warden
indicated a public rejection of capital punishment in all rape cases includ-
ing those in which life has been endangered, the court refused to expand
its ruling to cover rape in general, explicitly stating, "Lest our opinion be
given a breadth greater than is necessary for the decision of this case, we
do not hold . . . that death is an unconstitutional punishment for all
rapes." Id.
64. For example, Justice Blackmun, then on the Eighth Circuit,
concluded in Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 944 (1965), a case similar to Ralph:
Despite whatever personal attitudes lower federal court judges
as individuals might have toward capital punishment for rape,
any judicial determination that a state's (in this case, Arkan-
sas') long existent death-for-rape statute . . . imposes punish-
ment which is cruel and unusual, within the language of the
Eighth Amendment and, by referenced inclusion, violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment, must be for the Supreme Court in the




stitutionality of the punishment. The second is the danger of
permitting the populace to determine what punishment is "cruel
and unusual."
The first problem was raised in the dissent from the denial of
rehearing in Ralph, where it was contended that a rule prohib-
iting the imposition of the death sentence in rape cases unless
life is taken or endangered is an extremely imprecise instruc-
tion. 65 This contention is well-founded, since as one commenta-
tor noted:
There is a sense in which life is always endangered by sexual
attack, just as there is a sense in which it is always endangered
by robbery, or by burglary of a dwelling or by any physical as-
sault. The threat of violence is not the less a threat by being
.conditional, and violence always carries the possibility of a
fatal outcome.66
Evidently, the court in Ralph did not use the word "endangered"
in this sense; but it is not clear how it was used. Although
in Ralph the rapist broke into the victim's house at night, picked
up a tire iron, approached the small, frail victim and told her
that an outcry would result in death to her and her young son
asleep in the next room, the court ruled no life had been endan-
gered. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that in Ru-
dolph v. State6 7 and Snider v. Smith68 rape involved similar
aggravating circumstances, and yet in these cases Justice Gold-
berg dissented on the grounds that capital punishment for rape
in which life is not endangered may be unconstitutional; whereas
in two cases in the Eighth Circuit in which life was found to be
65. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 794-98 (4th Cir. 1971). The dis-
senters! other argument is that the standard used to establish the dis-
proportionateness of the punishment to the crime was the popular rejec-
tion of the death penalty in 1970, when the Fourth Circuit heard the case,
rather than the public attitude in 1961, when the crime was committed.
Such an argument seems fallacious. If a person commits a crime during
an era in which drawing and quartering is tolerated and a court is
called upon to judge the constitutionality of the sentence in an era in
which such punishment shocks the conscience, it seems unconscionable
to impose the punishment merely because the crime was committed dur-
ing a more barbarous period.
66. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HAnv. I Rsv.
1071, 1077 (1964).
67. 152 So. 2d 662 (Ala.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (assailant
threatened to kill victim and told her she could look at him but that she
wouldn't live to tell about it).
68. 187 F. Supp. 299 (E.D.Va. 1960), affd sub norn, Snider v. Cun-




endangered,6 9 the facts leaning toward that conclusion were no
stronger than those in Ralph, Snider and Rudolph.
In light of the difficulty in establishing a line separating those
cases in which capital punishment for rape is valid and those
in which it is not, it seems unnecessary to require such a divi-
sion. The arguments the court used in Ralph in reaching its
decision argue against the death penalty in any rape case,
since the statistics the court used did not differentiate between
the public attitude toward cases in which life was endangered
and those in which it was not.7 0 Moreover, since no statute ati-
thorizes capital punishment for attempted murder, even if the
victim is injured and his life endangered, it is inconsistent to al-
low execution of rapists who endanger their victims' lives, even
though an attempted murder with no other consequence is clearly
distinguishable from a threat to life accompanied by a rape.7 1 It
would therefore have been desirable for the court in Ralph to
have extended its ruling to invalidate capital punishment for rape
in all cases in which the victim was not killed.
The second and more serious danger results both from the
reasoning in Ralph and from that in most other lower federal
and state court decisions. These courts refuse to consider their
own consciences in assessing the cruelty of the punishment,
choosing instead to determine constitutionality by reference to
the "conscience of men today ' 72 as reflected in public opin-
ion or statutes passed by the elected representatives of the citi-
zenry. Such a criterion is disturbing for two reasons. First,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to discover the public's opinion.
Secondly, even if that opinion could be computed, the practice
of allowing the people to determine the application of a consti-
tutional doctrine gravely endangers the nation's minorities by
subjecting them to majority rule without regard to constitu-
tional mandates.
It has generally been conceded that the public's opinion is
unascertainable. As Judge Hand stated while attempting to
69. Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1019 (1966) (aged woman raped at knife point and robbed):
Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944
(1965) (victim bruised, apparently by an unarmed rapist, and threatened
with death).
70. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
71. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 1971) (concurrence
in the denial of the rehearing).
72. Turkington, supra note 26, at 161. See also text accompanying
notes 36-38, 44-45 supra.
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discover the public's sentiments: "It would not be practicable
S.. to conduct an inquiry as to what is the common conscience
....- 7 Yet, even if the attitude of a community is known or the
statutory authorizations of a state legislature are considered
to reflect the public's opinion in that state, the question becomes
which community is of importance in determining "commun-
ity opinion." For an offense committed in the United States,
should the public sentiment in foreign nations be relevant? And
for state offenses, should the opinion of other state legislatures
and of the public of those states be considered? Although the
latter question would seemingly be answered in the affirmative
in the interest of national uniformity, the court in United States
ex rel. Borgiono v. Ragen74 ruled that even though "one must
conclude from the evidence that 199-year sentences are unusual
in all parts of the United States, other than Illinois, and perhaps
Cook County, ' 75 they "do not shock the sense of justice of the
people of Illinois" and therefore do not constitute "cruel and
unusual" punishment.76
In addition to the difficulty of application, use of commun-
ity attitudes rather than a judge's opinion poses a danger to our
constitutional system.7 7 The Constitution and especially the Bill
73. Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2nd Cir. 1949).
Similarily, in United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952), Judge Frank was forced to determine
whether the imposition of the death penalty for treason shocked "the
conscience and sense of justice of the people of the United States" so as to
constitute "cruel and unusual punishment." He noted:
[Siuch a standard-the community's attitude-is usually an un-
knowable. It resembles a slithery shadow, since one can sel-
dom learn, at all accurately what the community, or a major-
ity, actually feels. Even a carefully-taken "public opinion poll"
would be inconclusive in a case like this.
Id.
74. 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D.fll. 1944), affd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945).
75. Id. at 981-82.
76. Id. at 981.
77. Even if public opinion is only used by a judge to interpret a
statute, rather than to determine its constitutionality or the constitu-
tionality of an act or decision, the judicial process is harmed in two re-
spects. First, the judge avoids personal responsibility for his decision
merely by relying upon the indefinite standard of the community. As
Edmond N. Cahn noted, "[w] e have ... cause to fear the making of de-
cisions by a judge who deems himself the mouthpiece of an unidentifia-
ble, amorphous, and irresponsible mass." Cahn, Authority and Responsi-
bility, 51 CoLum. L. Rsv. 838, 850 (1951). Moreover it seems more ad-
vantageous to incorporate the moral values of a judge (what shocks his
conscience) into the law than the values of the masses as conceived by
the same judge. As Calm explained in speaking of Judge Hand's fre-
quent deference to the standards of the community in cases in which stat-
1971]
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of Rights were intended to protect individuals against federal
and state government and against the majority of the public;78
yet, by allowing the majority through public opinion polls
and the decisions of its elected officials in the state legislatures
to determine the constitutionality of punishment, the Eighth
Amendment protection is drastically curtailed. As former Jus-
tice Goldberg stated:
[C]onstitutional protection [should not] depend upon virtually
unanimous condemnation of the penalty at issue. Were wide ac-
ceptance-measured by statutory authorization or public opin-
ion polls-enough to authorize a punishment, the clause would
indeed be "drained of any independent integrity as a govern-
ing normative principle." Like no other constitutional pro-
vision, its only function would be to legitimize advances already
made by the other departments and opinions already the con-
ventional wisdom. It would forbid only extremely aberrant pen-
alties. The framers cannot have intended so narrow a role for
the basic guaranty of human rights.7 9
Moreover, if the "public conscience" concept is interpreted to
mean the sentiments of the people of the forum state as reflected
by the statutes passed by their elected officials, even the "ex-
tremely aberrant penalties" escape the prohibition of the Eight
Amendment. 0
Much of the time, of course, the consciences of justices as in-
terpreters of the Constitution and the public conscience coin-
utes referred to "crimes involving the moral turpitude":
But by subordinating his own moral principles to those of the
market place, Judge Hand seriously distorted the function of the
court .... He distorted the court's function because instead of
exercising such influence as he could to raise the morals of the
marketplace [sic] to a level approaching his own, he expressed
an attitude of resignation ....
Id. at 844.
78. S. KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE POLITICAL PRocEss,
109-10 (1965); Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REv.
1268, 1351 (1968).
79. Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Uncon-
stitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773, 1782 (1970).
80. For instance in State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 587, 190 A.2d 514 (1963),
whipping was upheld by Delaware's Supreme Court as constitutionally
permissible:
Today, however, there has been no legal and effective
expression of people speaking through the General Assembly[of Delaware] that whipping is a cruel punishment in the con-
stitutional sense. Indeed, we think we may judicially notice the
fact that there is undoubtedly a decided difference in view on the
part of the people. What the weight of public opinion pro or con
is, we have no way of knowing. Certain it is, however, that as
yet the only constitutionally sound way of expressing the pub-
lic sentiment, by act of Assembly, has not condemned the im-
position of lashes as a cruel punishment.
Id. at 595, 190 A.2d at 518. Such an interpretation leaves the Eighth
Amendment devoid of meaning.
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cide. During these periods the test used by the lower courts will
not have harmful results. In generations not as tolerant as the
present, however, absolute deference to public opinion polls
and state statutes can be disastrous. It is in these generations
that the Constitutional protection becomes most vital and must
be given significance independent of the public conscience. As
one commentator noted:
It would follow that wide acceptance is no reason to hold a
penalty consistent with the eighth amendment. Just as the first
amendment's protection is especially important for unpopular
speech and critical for hated expression, so is the eighth
amendment's prohibition of retribution essential precisely when
a majority is outraged by criminal behavior.8 1
The potential for abuse of such a standard in such an era of
excitement was painfully evident in United States v. Rosen-
berg,82 in which the Rosenbergs were sentenced to death for
communicating secret information to Russia. In 1951 Judge
Frank upheld the sentence, concluding, "Assuming the applica-
bility of the community-attitude test ... ,it is impossible to say
that the community is shocked and outraged by such sentences
resting on such facts.183 Perhaps the decision would have been
the same in the 1940's or 1960's or 1970's; yet, it cannot be said
that the attitude of the public in 1951 during the midst of the
red scare was a rational one on which a Constitutional decision
should have been based.84
In applying other Constitutional Amendments, the courts
have realized the dangers of deferring to public sentiment and
81. Comment, supra note 78, at 1351. Even if Aldridge v. Common-
wealth, 4 Va. 447 (1826), one of the first cases in the United States to
interpret a "cruel and unusual punishment" clause, the court noted:
[T]his section in the [Virginia] Bill of Rights, was framed
effectually to exclude these [punishments], so that no future
Legislature, in a moment perhaps of great general excitement,
should be tempted to disgrace our Code by the introduction of
any of these odious modes of punishment
Id. at 450.
82. 195 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
83. Id. at 609.
84. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of petitioners for conspiring to advocate the
overthrow of the United States government and to organize the com-
munist party. In dissent, Justice Black stated:
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the
conviction of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, how-
ever, that in calmer times, when present pressures, passions, and
fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the First
Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they be-
long in a free society.
Id. at 581 (dissenting opinion).
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have rejected previous "community standards" tests.s Un-
fortunately, however, the courts have ignored the identical dan-
gers of using public opinion polls and state laws reflecting pub-
lic opinion to determine the constitutionality of punishments.
Today, 20 years after Rosenberg, the dangers inherent in the
reasoning of that case have not convinced the state and lower
federal courts in cases such as Ralph to include their personal
evaluations of the gravity of the crimes for which the punish-
ments are imposed and the effect of the punishments upon the
offenders. Until that change is made, the Eighth Amendment will
continue to be subject to the will of a sometimes irrational and
sometimes panic-stricken people, a danger against which the Bill
of Rights was designed to protect.
85. For instance, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), decided
two years prior to United States v. Rosenberg, the Supreme Court re-
fused to extend the Weeks doctrine, excluding evidence secured in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment from admission in federal courts, to the
states. After examining the law of other states and nations, it concluded:
When we find that in fact most of the English-speaking world
does not regard as vital to such protection [against arbitrary
intrusion by the police] the exclusion of evidence thus obtained,
we must hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential ingredient
of the right [of due process]. The contrariety of views of the
States is particularly impressive in view of the careful recon-
sideration which we have given the problem in light of the
Weeks decision.
Id. at 29. In dissent, Justice Murphy declared, "I cannot believe that we
should decide due process questions by simply taking a poll of the rules
in various jurisdictions . . . ." Id. at 46 (dissenting opinion). The Court
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), agreed, reversing the Wolf de-
cision. It first stated, "While they are not basically relevant to a deci-
sion that the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the Fourth
Amendment as the right it embodies is vouchsafed against the States by
the Due Process Clause, we will consider the current validity of the fac-
tual grounds upon which Wolf was based." Id. at 651. After noting that
more states had accepted the Weeks doctrine since the time of the Wolf
decision, it concluded:
It, therefore, plainly appears that the factual considerations
supporting the failure of the Wolf Court to include the Weeks
exclusionary rule when it recognized the enforceability of the
right to privacy against the States in 1949, while not basically
relevant to the constitutional consideration, could not, in any
analysis, now be deemed controlling. Id. at 653.
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Constitutional Law: Free Exercise of
Religion vs. Compulsory Education
Defendants, members of the Old Order Amish religion, were
convicted of violating the Wisconsin compulsory education law'
requiring parents to send their children to school through the
age of 16. Defendants asserted that the right to practice religion
as protected by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment 2
made enforcement of the education law against them unconstitu-
tional. The trial court held that although the law interfered with
the freedom of the defendants to follow their religious beliefs, the
statute was a constitutional exercise of state power. The circuit
court affirmed. On appeal, the Wisconsin supreme court re-
versed, holding that the state interest in compulsory education
did not justify infringing upon defendants' rights to free exercise
of their religion. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d
539 (1971). 3
This comment will examine the case in the light of two issues:
(1) whether the Amish proscription against attending school past
the eighth grade, a matter of religious belief, is within the scope
of protection of the free exercise clause; and (2) whether the par-
ents' right to free exercise of their religion outweighs the need
of the state to protect the children's right to choose their own life
style.
1. Protection Under the Free Exercise Clause
The Old Order Amish belief that their children should not
attend school beyond the eighth grade is based on a biblical com-
mand that they should live apart from contemporary society, se-
questered in a culture of their own.4 The earliest case in this
1. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15(1) (1967) requires that any person
with a child between the ages of seven and 16 under his control must
have the child attend either a public or private school.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof ... ." The First Amendment has been made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Hughes v. California,
339 U.S. 460 (1950); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
3. Cert. granted, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 39 U.S.L.W. 3520 (May 18,
1971).
4. See generally Note, The Right Not to Be Modern Men: The
Amish and Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REv. 925 (1967).
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area, Pennsylvania v. Beiler,5 recognized the life style of the
Amish as a religious belief. In Ohio v. Hershberger,O however,
the court did not find a conflict between compulsory education
and Amish beliefs. In that case the court distinguished between
religious belief and religious conduct and held that the require-
ment that the Amish educate their children did not abridge the
right to worship. This implicit distinction between religious be-
lief and conduct was articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,7 which forbade any government
interference with religious beliefs, but distinguished conduct
from beliefs. The court ruled in effect that a person is free to
believe what he wishes, but his conduct-affirmative acts or
omissions-may be regulated for the attainment of permissible
state goals.8
This traditional dichotomy between belief and conduct was
subsequently narrowed by the United States Supreme Court in
Sherbert v. VernerY In that case a Seventh Day Adventist was
denied unemployment compensation for refusing to accept a job
that required work on Saturday, the Sabbath for Adventists. In
holding that this regulation was an unconstitutional infringement
of the free exercise clause the Court broadened the provision to
include the refusal to act. The Sherbert case does not, however,
compel the decision in Yoder. For example, in the only post-Sher-
bert case dealing with the Amish, the Kansas supreme court in
Kansas v. Garber'0 found the Amish beliefs on education not
within the constitutional protection of the free exercise clause.
Using an analysis similar to Beiler, the court separated religious
belief and religious conduct, holding that even in light of Sher-
5. 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).
6. 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955).
7. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
8. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the Court consid-
ered the other side of the free exercise question. Orthodox Jews who
closed their businesses on Saturdays challenged the application of a
Sunday closing law to them, asserting impairment of their ability to
earn a livelihood. A majority of the Court disagreed, distinguishing
between laws regulating religious acts and laws regulating a secular
activity that makes the holding of religious beliefs more expensive. In
Braunfeld the additional cost of holding Orthodox Jewish beliefs was
closing shop for two days of the week rather than the state-compelled
one day. The Court found that any law which impedes the observance
of a religion or of all religions or which discriminates invidiously be-
tween religions is unconstitutional. However, if the law regulates only
secular activity (e.g., days of business), the law's indirect effect on re-
ligious beliefs does not make the law constitutionally invalid.
9. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
10. 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967).
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bert, the refusal to educate children constituted unprotected con-
duct. This reasoning, however, was rejected by the court in the
instant case. The court began its analysis by noting that the es-
sence of the Old Order Anish religion is not the traditional reli-
gious service, but their life style. 1 In ruling that the life style of
the Amish is their religion, the court found Garber to be a "me-
chanical separation" of conduct and belief and rejected the argu-
ment that constitutional protection extends only to direct in-
fringement of the act of worship.12
The holding in Yoder that Amish beliefs on education are
within the free exercise clause takes cognizance of the delicate
nature of the free exercise right. The structure of the Amish reli-
gion presents difficulties because it does not fit within either of
the traditional categories of conduct or belief. Although the free
exercise clause is most easily claimed as a protection for the con-
ventional aspects of a religion, the nature of the protection should
be no less applicable to those religions which do not consist of
conventional religious services, but which, as in the case of the
Amish, consist of a life style. Since the free exercise clause is de-
signed to prevent state-imposed restrictions on religions, a court's
attempt to separate a defendant's religion into beliefs and conduct
is an invasion of the protected area of the free exercise clause, 13
and was rightly rejected by the court in Yoder.
2. Balancing the State's and the Parents' Interests
The second issue raised by Yoder is whether the state's inter-
est in compulsory education outweighs the parents' right to free
exercise of their religion. Pennsylvania v. Beiler1 4 was the only
11. 49 Wis. 2d at 435, 182 N.W.2d at 541.
12. Garber was subsequently undercut by a legislatively provided
exemption for the Amish. KAN. STAT. ANx. § 72-1111 (Supp. 1969).
13. 49 Wis. 2d at 436-37, 182 N.W.2d at 542. The opposite argu-
ment is that where a religious group is exempted from sanctions im-
posed on others for prohibited conduct, such a rule is a preferential es-
tablishment prohibited by the establishment clause of the First Amend-
ment. See generally Donnici, Governmental Encouragement of Religi-
ous Ideology: A Study of the Current Conscientious Objector Exemp-
tion from Military Service, 13 J. Pun. L. 16, 43 (1964). This assertion
ignores the delicate balancing of religious freedom and police power
which is especially important in a society comprised of as many di-
verse religious groups as is the United States. Acceptance of the argu-
ment that a religiously oriented exemption violates the establishment
clause requires a choice between education and religious freedom in the
instant case, making impossible the legislative or judicial compromises
that help fulfill the requirements of both education and religious free-
dom.
14. 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).
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previous case to recognize the Amish proscription against higher
education as protected by the free exercise clause, and thus the
only other case that balanced the state's and the parents' rights.
In balancing these interests the Beiler court found an "abso-
lute right to believe but only a limited right to act."'" The United
States Supreme Court reached a similar result in Prince v. Massa-
chusetts,' where it upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness
who permitted a nine year old child to sell religious publications
in violation of a child labor statute. The Court found the conduct
to be within the ambit of the free exercise clause, but in balancing
the interests of the state and the interests of the woman and
child the Court found state interest overriding. 1'7
The court in Yoder weighed the burden of forced attend-
ance against the state interest in compulsory education and
found the burden to be a heavy one since the compulsory attend-
ance law required affirmative acts in violation of Amish religious
beliefs.'8 The court viewed the parent's choice as "to either
obey its [the law's] commands and risk the loss of his salvation
or to disobey the law and invite criminal sanctions."19 The court
defined "compelling" as the need to apply regulations without ex-
ception in order to attain a legislative purpose and did not find
the state interest in compulsory education compelling. 20 Analyz-
ing the state interest in compulsory education in terms of per-
formance of public responsibilities, good citizenship and helping
the child to adjust to cultural values and prepare for further pro-
fessional training, the court accepted the Amish claim that their
program of parentally supervised farm work trained children for
society as well as two additional years of high school.
15. Id. at 468, 79 A.2d at 137.
16. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
17. While parents have a strong natural interest in the upbringing
of their children, the state's interest in the child's welfare as parens
patriae is overriding where the child's welfare in such vital areas as
health care is concerned. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967); Snyder v. Mason, 328 Mich. 277, 43 N.W.2d 849 (1950);
In re Clark, 21 Ohio App. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962). See also Annot.,
30 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1953), and note 20 supra.
18. The belief-conduct dichotomy had its origin in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), where the court upheld a polygamy
conviction notwithstanding the requirement of the defendant's faith
that he practice polygamy.
19. 49 Wis. 2d at 437, 182 N.W.2d at 542.
20. The Yoder dissent disagrees strongly, citing the importance of
education from the time of the Northwest Ordinance and the United
States Supreme Court's statement in Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483,
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The state in Yoder also argued that under the doctrine of
parens patriae2 1 the judgment of the parents should be over-
ruled and the state's protection of the child substituted. The
court, however, ruled that a parent's right to bring up his chil-
dren in his religion outweighed any harm that might be done
to a child by the loss of two years of high school. The court prem-
ised this conclusion on the rationale that a child could decide for
himself at a later age whether or not to retain the Amish life
style, but until that time the state should not be permitted to
force education on him which might influence that choice. The
court also found that the subjugation of all Amish children to an
education they did not want or need for the sake of those few who
might wish to leave was not a compelling interest.22
In holding that the defendant Amish fathers are protected
under the free exercise clause,23 the Yoder court failed to ade-
quately consider the interests of the children themselves. If
only the parents and the state had been affected by this case,
it would be far easier to find the state interest uncompelling
since, as the court noted, compulsory education would not have
been severely disrupted. However, the children involved also
have a right to choose which religion to follow and what life style
they wish to adopt. The court did not consider the peculiar nature
of the Amish religion, in which religion and life style are synono-
mous. This aspect of the religion locks the children into the
Amish sect by making it very difficult for them to choose another
way of life because of their limited employability. This failure
was implicitly recognized by the court when it cited the testi-
mony of one child that she did not wish to continue her educa-
tion as support for its reasoning that the possibility that some
491 (1954), that "[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the im-
portance of education to our democratic society." 49 Wis. 2d at 449,
182 N.W.2d at 548 (dissenting opinion). Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
499 (1961), discussed in note 8 supra, is not contra to the majority's
definition of compelling interest. In order to make the uniform day of
rest effective it must be total, otherwise commercial activities would
continue all week.
21. Constitutional considerations limit the application of the state's
right to step in and protect the interests of the child under the doctrine
of parens patriae. It is only where there is a definite overriding interest
that requires a child's protection that the state may step in. See note
17 supra.
22. 49 Wis. 2d at 438-39, 182 N.W.2d at 542-43. See also note 20
supra, and accompanying text.




children might wish to leave the Amish religion or want further
education was not a compelling interest.2 4
Yoder is the first case giving judicial relief to Amish defend-
ants who refused to send their children to school after the eighth
grade; but by doing so the decision completely ignores the rights
of Amish children. Because of this one-sided consideration of a
complex question, Yoder is not likely to be followed in its entirety
by other courts faced with the same difficult issues. The Yoder
case does appreciate the complex questions involved in the
consideration of whether a particular act or omission falls
under the free exercise clause, but fails to follow its analysis
through to the other side of the issue. As the dissent in Yoder
points out, finding that the compulsory education law unconstitu-
tionally infringes upon the free exercise of Amish religion does
not compel a holding that it cannot apply at all.25
24. 49 Wis. 2d at 438, 182 N.W.2d at 542.
25. Id. at 453, 182 N.W.2d at 550. The Yoder dissent posits one
method of accomplishing a compromise in order to balance the conflict
between the state and parents by affirming the sentence but staying
execution to give the Amish time to establish a vocational school.
After the school is established, the judgment would be vacated and the
complaint dismissed. Id. at 455, 182 N.W.2d at 551.
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